

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00136 01 OF 02 161754Z

ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 EB-08 /102 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2686

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0136

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 16 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 164TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON MARCH 16 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF POLISH REP (STRULAK), FRG REP (BEHREND) DELIVERED THE ONLY FORMAL STATEMENT. IN HIS PRESENTATION, BEHREND CONTRASTED THE UNREALISTIC NATURE OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WITH THE REALISM OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE FRG STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1) PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF A CORRECT AND REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00136 01 OF 02 161754Z

IN EUROPE AS SUCH AN ASSESSMENT, INCLUDING AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES, IS A PREREQUISITE FOR REALISTICALLY JUDGING THE IMPACT OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY OF PARTICIPANTS.

2) IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE EAST HAS SUPERIORITIES IN

MILITARY MANPOWER AND MOST MAJOR ARMAMENTS NOTWITH-
STANDING EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE PRESENT FORCE
RELATIONSHIP THERE IS CHARACTERIZED BY APPROXIMATE
EQUALITY.

3) EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THERE IS APPROXIMATE
EQUALITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES
IN THE AREA ARE CONTRADICTED BOTH BY WESTERN FIGURES AND
BY EASTERN STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE TABLING
OF EASTERN DATA.

4) THE EAST CANNOT EXPECT THE WEST TO ACCEPT
EASTERN FIGURES AT FACE VALUE SIMPLY BECAUSE SUCH
FIGURES HAVE BEEN TABLED, BUT RATHER BOTH SIDES MUST
WORK THROUGH THE DATA DISCUSSION TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT
ON THE EXISTING FORCE STRENGTHS OF EACH SIDE.

5) EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MOST MAJOR ARMAMENTS
CANNOT REALISTICALLY BE DENIED.

6) GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN
ANY REDUCTION AND LIMITATION AGREEMENT.

7) THE EAST'S CONSIDERABLE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES
STEM FROM THE TERRITORIAL PROXIMITY OF THE USSR TO
THE REDUCTION AREA AND CANNOT BE IGNORED BY WESTERN
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00136 01 OF 02 161754Z

PARTICIPANTS, ALL THE MORE SO SINCE THESE ADVANTAGES
WOULD BE ENHANCED UNDER AN AGREEMENT.

8) THE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EAST
WOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED BY WESTERN PROPOSALS ESPECIALLY IN
LIGHT OF THE VERY LARGE FORCES ON CONTIGUOUS SOVIET
TERRITORY WHICH WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN SIZE UNDER AN
AGREEMENT.

9) ALTHOUGH THE EAST DOES NOT CONTEST THE EQUITY OF
AN OUTCOME BASED ON PARITY AS THE WEST HAS PROPOSED,
THE OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS BASED ON EASTERN PROPOSALS
WOULD NOT CONFORM WITH THIS PRINCIPLE BUT WOULD CON-
TRACTUALIZE EASTERN ADVANTAGES IN MILITARY MANPOWER
AND MOST MAJOR ARMAMENTS.

10) IMPLEMENTATION OF EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD BE
PREJUDICIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY THUS LEADING TO
CONSEQUENCES UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

11) REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS MUST FOCUS ON GROUND
FORCES SINCE SUCH FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL FOR SEIZING AND

HOLDING TERRITORY AND BECAUSE THE LARGE EASTERN
SUPERIORITY IN SUCH FORCES IS THE KEY DESTABLIZING
ELEMENT IN THE AREA.

12) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD
ESTABLISH A MORE BALANCED AND STABLE SECURITY SITUATION

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00136 02 OF 02 161800Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0136

IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

13) THE WESTERN SELECTIVE APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS
REDUCTIONS REPRESENTS THE MOST PRACTICAL MEANS OF
AVOIDING THE UNACCEPTABLE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF EASTERN
ARMAMENT SUPERIORITIES AND THE INHERENT COMPLEXITY
OF ESTABLISHING EQUIVALENTS FOR VARIOUS ARMAMENTS.

14) COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO AVOID
THE DIMINUTION OF WESTERN SECURITY WHICH WOULD RESULT
FROM NATIONAL CEILINGS.

15) A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE
AREA IS JUSTIFIED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE
USSR AND ITS WORLD POWER STATUS.

16) ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT FLANK
SECURITY MUST BE SAFEGUARDED IN AN AGREEMENT, EASTERN

PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD ARE INADEQUATE AND UNREALISTIC.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00136 02 OF 02 161800Z

17) WHILE THE WESTERN APPROACH STRIKES A FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF EAST AND WEST AND WOULD ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE, EASTERN PROPOSALS, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MATERIALLY ALTERED SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE TALKS, NEGLECT BASIC WESTERN SECURITY NEEDS.

18) EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSESS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE REALISTICALLY, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO WESTERN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND ADOPT A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT PROSPECTS FOR THEIR SUCCESS CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED. RESOR

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